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Rethinking Electricity Sector Reform in Developing Asia: 
Balancing Economic and Environmental Objectives 
 
Anupama Sen, Rabindra Nepal, Tooraj Jamasb 
 
 
Abstract 
The OECD or ‘standard’ model of electricity sector reforms has been 
widely adopted in non-OECD Asian countries since the 1990s. However, 
despite two decades of attempts at reforms, no notable progress has been 
made towards the original objectives of reform. Whilst in OECD countries, 
reforms were implemented against excess capacity and stable institutions, 
in developing non-OECD Asian countries they were implemented against 
chronic electricity shortages, fiscal constraints, weak institutions, and 
complex political factors. In recent years the debate also focuses on the 
suitability of electricity market reforms originally designed around fossil 
fuels in delivering low carbon electricity systems. With electricity demand 
set to double over the next two decades, reforms in non-OECD Asian 
countries have important economic as well as environmental implications 
in terms of global energy use and emissions. This chapter assesses the 
application of the OECD model of electricity reform in Asia. We analyse 
the experience of three South Asian countries – India, Nepal and Bhutan, 
to illustrate the economic and environmental conflicts in electricity market 
reform against the context of cross-border regional electricity trade. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Many of the electricity reform programmes currently being undertaken across 
developing economies in non-OECD Asia originated in the experiences of a group of 
OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s. 1  These were, primarily, the United 
Kingdom (England and Wales), Norway, the USA, and Chile – often highlighted as  
forerunners (Pollitt, 2004). Reform entailed restructuring the sector from a scenario 
characterised by state-owned, vertically integrated entities, into one where smaller, 
and in most cases privately-owned firms, competed for the provision of electricity 
supplies (Sen et al, 2016). From these experiences emerged a raft of basic reform 
measures or ‘blueprint’, which included: 
• opening the electricity sector to Independent Power Producers (IPPs),2 
• corporatization 3  of vertically integrated state-owned utilities and the 
commercialization of their functions, 
• enactment of electricity legislation, 
• establishment of an independent electricity regulator, 
• unbundling of vertically integrated utilities into competitive (generation and 
supply) and regulated (transmission and distribution) segments, and 
• divestiture or privatization of the unbundled utilities. 
 
Collectively, these measures came to be known as the ‘standard model’ of electricity 
reform. 4  Wholesale markets featured prominently in the details of the standard 
model, as did retail competition and consumer choice. The standard model was 
based on the implicit assumptions of well-functioning markets, developed institutions, 
and stable political frameworks found in developed countries. 
                                                          
1  Some of the arguments in this chapter were first developed in a working paper: Sen, A. 
(2014).’Divergent Paths to a Common Goal: An Overview of Challenges to Electricity Sector Reform 
in Developing versus Developed Countries’, EL10, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. 
2 Privately owned electricity generation companies which produce electricity for sale to utilities. 
3 The creation of separate legal entities. 
4 Also the ‘textbook’ or ‘prescriptive’ approach (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008; Joskow, 2008; Victor 
and Heller, 2007). 
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Although the arguments in favor of electricity market reform via the OECD model 
primarily focused on its economic benefits,5 the literature presents mixed evidence 
on whether the predominant drivers behind initial reform, particularly in the UK, were 
purely economic, or ideological (Newbery, 2013; Rutledge, 2010; Helm, 2010; Keay, 
2009).6 It has been suggested that the economic rationale for market liberalization 
evolved ex post and was secondary to ideological and political considerations 
(Rutledge, 2010).7 
 
Evidence on the success of reforms in developed economies is mixed; the literature 
suggests that it is difficult to attribute the improvements in operational efficiency to 
reform per se when there has been a combination of external factors.8 There is a 
vast literature documenting the early experience of reforms in developed countries 
(Sen, 2014). 9  However, growing environmental pressures and international 
consensus towards climate change mitigation since 200910, have prompted fresh 
debates over the effectiveness and the mission of electricity reforms, as 
decarbonisation has been incorporated into reforms as an important environmental 
objective. This is because the electricity sector presents the biggest opportunity to 
bring about the single largest emissions reduction in many countries (IEA, 2015). 
 
                                                          
5 Specifically pertaining to improvements in the efficiency of operation of utilities brought about by 
greater competition, which could then be passed on to consumers through competitive (potentially 
lower) prices and better quality of service. 
6 For instance, the political factors underpinning electricity reform in the UK included weakening the 
power of the coal unions and the CEGB. But there was also the expectation that competition would 
lead to improvements in the efficiency of operations. Further, privatization and restructuring in a 
system with excess supply involved very little risk. 
7  It should also be noted that these political considerations may have varied, although reform 
converged around the same set of principles. Thus for instance, while in Norway reforms were aimed 
at a pragmatic restructuring of the electricity sector and were initiated by a Labour government, 
privatisation was off the table from the very beginning. In the EU, reforms were a part of the wider 
integration process, although member-states had the freedom to decide upon their policy paths. And 
in the UK, there are still debates around whether it was politics or economics that influenced initial 
reforms (Rutledge, 2010). 
8 For example, falling prices of fuel inputs could have coincided with reform; similarly, improved labour 
productivity could simply be attributed to cuts in the labour force following privatization (Rutledge, 
2010). The existence of excess capacity at the outset in most of these early reformer countries was 
also indicative of lower risks (Sen, 2014). Further, technological changes within the industry which 
were to some extent endogenous to the reform process itself, also played an important role. 
9 Newbery (2013); Keay et al. (2013a; 2013b); Rutledge (2010); Bye and Hope (2005); Magnus 
(1997); Newbery and Pollitt (1997). 
10 This was a watershed year as the Copenhagen climate change summit saw major developing 
countries like India adopt ‘national missions’ on climate change mitigation, laying the ground for 
COP21 in December 2015. 
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Consequently, in OECD countries, reforms have been under review to incorporate 
emissions reduction goals. In developing non-OECD Asia, however, this poses an 
additional challenge as governments already struggle to successfully square 
efficiency objectives of electricity reform with access and distributional objectives. 
 
South Asia alone accounts for 25% of global population yet just 5% of global 
electricity consumption. Just under a third of India’s population of 1.2 billion still 
subsists on non-commercial energy sources. Moreover, electricity demand in non-
OECD Asia as a whole is predicted to double over the next two decades: the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that it will rise from 6,317 Terawatt hours 
(TWh) in 2012 to 13,982 TWh by 2035 (IEA, 2014). Total installed capacity 
(Gigawatts) in non-OECD Asian economies comprises 30% of global installed 
capacity, and is predicted to grow to 44% by 2040, but will be insufficient to meet 
rising demand (IEA, 2014). Emissions from non-OECD Asia, however, already 
comprise around 38% of global emissions, and given rising demand, there will be 
increasing pressure from tightening post-COP21 global climate architecture for these 
countries to tackle environmental objectives. While meeting this demand will be a 
challenge, doing so in a sustainable way will be even more difficult. 
 
In this chapter we review the progress in adoption of the OECD model of electricity 
reform in non-OECD Asian developing countries, highlighting the fact that most 
countries are midway towards the implementation of liberalized electricity markets. 
However, we also argue that pursuing the OECD model to completion can lead to 
adverse environmental outcomes in these countries. We conclude that a new 
paradigm of electricity reform is needed in Asia, which balances economic and 
environmental objectives. 
 
The remaining sections organized as follow. Section 2 reviews the implementation of 
the OECD reform model, Section 3 analyses the environmental dimension and its 
implications for electricity reform in developing Asia, Section 4 discusses the 
experiences of three Asian countries – India, Nepal and Bhutan, highlighting not just 
5 
the contradictions between economic and environmental objectives, but their 
complexities with cross-border electricity trade. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Standard Reform Model in Non-OECD Asia 
 
From the 1990s, there was a gradual and widespread adoption of the standard 
model of electricity reform (or its variants) across developing non-OECD Asia. The 
drivers behind this have been categorized into ‘pull factors’ and ‘push factors’ (Nepal 
and Jamasb 2011). The ‘pull’ factors included a demonstration effect following 
experiences in the OECD (Zhang et al., 2008). The ‘push factors’ were twofold; the 
first related to the adoption of structural adjustment programmes, e.g. in India as a 
condition of multilateral financial assistance following balance of payments crises.11 
 
The second ‘push factor’ was related to endemic problems within the electricity 
sectors of developing countries, and a genuine need for reform. The sector in most 
developing countries was publicly owned, through vertically integrated entities which 
carried out generation, transmission, and distribution, as well as infrastructure 
creation. Vertically integrated monopolies, based on the economies of scale and 
scope12 argument, were deemed to be the best way of extending electricity to the 
majority of the populations that lacked access to it. Similarly, public ownership was 
justified on the basis that the state was the custodian of public interest, the enabler 
of necessary coordination among different segments (generation, transmission, and 
distribution), and necessary to the strategic nature of the sector, given its role in 
development (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008). 
 
The concentration of all functions in singular state-owned entities, with no effective 
self-imposed or independent oversight, led to technical and financial problems 
(Victor and Heller 2007). Transmission and distribution losses in developing 
economies averaged 20% prior to reform, in comparison with a world average of 9% 
                                                          
11The literature indicates that much of this was tied to the introduction of private investment through 
IPPs (Williams and Ghanadan, 2006). 
12That is, limiting the risks associated with large-scale investment. Governments can also use a public 
or privately owned monopoly to finance public objectives that the company may otherwise not 
undertake, such as rural electrification. 
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(Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008). The number of employees per million units of 
electricity sold was 5 for India, compared with 0.1 for Norway13 (Sen, 2014). There is 
a large literature attributing the underlying reasons for these inefficiencies to the 
politicization of the sector and its capture by politicians to seek votes through the 
promise of low-priced electricity, partly financed through government subsidies, and 
partly by the state-owned enterprises themselves. Such actions forced state-owned 
enterprises to maintain the prices below costs of supply, constraining the amount by 
which prices could be adjusted upwards against increases in the cost of supply. This 
in turn limited the amount of capital available for reinvestment in infrastructure and 
access – thus defeating the original purpose of state-controlled electricity provision 
and engendering a culture of wastefulness and political opportunism (Tongia, 2003; 
Dubash and Singh, 2005). In India, this circular problem was demonstrated by the 
fact that, despite successive increases in expenditure allocated to electricity within 
the Five Year Plans, capacity addition targets were rarely achieved and state-owned 
utilities continue to accumulate losses. 
 
Therefore, in developed countries, the underlying logic and objectives for reform 
were higher efficiency, lower prices, consumer choice, and national competitiveness 
(Williams and Ghanadan, 2006). In developing countries, the objectives were more 
to do with the declining state of utilities’ finances, propagation of private investment 
to enable infrastructure, technology upgrades, and removal of the electricity supply 
constraint on growth. (Williams and Ghanadan, 2006). Developing economies also 
faced a capacity shortage, which meant that the risks in reform were higher at the 
outset in comparison with developed economies. 
 
At the time of initial reform, the OECD or standard model was presented as a 
solution for technical and financial inefficiencies and at infusing transparency into the 
operations of state-owned enterprises in developing economies. Technological 
advancements had also rendered the economies of scale argument redundant. 
Thus, the standard reform model effectively represented a ‘common path’ but to 
‘different goals’ for the OECD and non-OECD economies. Further, although there 
was a general sequence that had been intended to shape the basic reform 
                                                          
13Norway carried out reforms entirely within the public sector. 
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measures, 14  non-OECD Asian economies ended up adopting variations of it, as 
reform tended to occur in fits and starts. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1: Electricity Reforms in Non-OECD Asia, 2013 
 
Independent 
Power 
Producers 
 
Regulator 
 
Unbund
-ling 
 
Corporat-
isation 
 
Open/Thir
d Party 
Access15 
 
Distributio
n 
Privatisatio
n 
 
Bangladesh x x x x   
Bhutan x x x x   
Brunei  x    x 
China x x x x   
India x x x x x x 
Indonesia x  x x x  
Laos x      
Malaysia x x x x   
Maldives x x  x   
Myanmar x x     
Nepal x x x x   
Pakistan x x x x   
Philippines x x x x x x 
Singapore x x x x x x 
Sri Lanka x x     
Thailand x x x x x  
Vietnam x x x x   
 
Source: Sen et al. (2016) 
 
                                                          
14 A ‘scorecard’ for electricity reforms, citing the different steps and the sequence, was developed to 
broadly measure progress (Bacon, 1999). 
15  Open access has been implemented to varying degrees; in the majority it has been confined to large 
consumers. 
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Table 2.1 depicts the progress of reforms set against the ‘standard’ reform model 
used to assess its milestones for 17 prominent non-OECD Asian countries. The entry 
of Independent Power Producers (IPPs) into generation is the most widely adopted 
measure (Figure 2.1), but only four countries have progressed to distribution 
privatisation. Further, open (or third party) access, a fundamental enabler of retail 
competition has been adopted in just 5 countries, and restricted to large consumers. 
Experiences have been mixed across countries. 
 
Figure 2.1: IPP Investments in Asia, 1990-2014 
 
 
Source: World Bank PPI Database16 
 
One of the main motivations for the introduction of IPPs, the most popular measure, 
were introduced, was they there were a quick way to introduce competition without 
significant restructuring.17 They transferred investment risks to utilities and in some 
cases ultimately to consumers (through higher tariffs) through the ‘take or pay’ 
clauses prevalent in many contracts. While some countries (e.g., Malaysia and 
Singapore) coped by evolving their sectors to adapt to this risk, many (e.g. India and 
Pakistan) struggled to harness IPPs to fit with their fiscal and institutional contexts 
leading to a spate of renegotiations and cancellations (Sen et al., 2016). 
 
                                                          
16Graphed according to the year of financial closure. 
17IPPs were also a way of adding capacity. 
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However, political factors have markedly impeded IPPs’ success. For instance, the 
Philippines in the 1990s successfully contracted IPPs for 40% of generation capacity, 
as did Indonesia – however, following the Asian financial crisis a spate of 
renegotiations uncovered allegations of patronage in the awarding of IPP contracts 
in both countries (Henisz and Zelner, 2002; Wu and Sulistiyanto, 2013). 
 
Among smaller countries, Laos, Bhutan and Nepal have significant hydropower 
potential, some of which has been developed through IPPs. However, concerns over 
property rights and sovereignty have prevented their progress. In China, the lack of 
grid integration meant that despite the early introduction of IPPs, capacity surpluses 
could not be spread to deficit regions, making IPP investments susceptible to 
regional supply and demand fluctuations (Wu, 2005b). The reorientation of 
multilateral financing towards clean energy has stalled IPPs in newly hydrocarbon-
rich countries such as Bangladesh and Myanmar. 
 
Although the majority of non-OECD Asian countries have established some type of 
electricity regulator, in most cases these are not independent from government. In 
countries where electricity reform is lagging, the main issue faced by regulators 
relates to reforming tariffs to reflect costs (e.g., India, Pakistan). Where markets have 
largely developed, issues include the mitigation of market power, which in many 
cases is exercised by state owned companies (e.g. Thailand, Philippines). Some 
countries such as China have aimed to consolidate electricity regulation with other 
energy-related sectors. In smaller oil import-dependent countries such as Maldives, 
the regulator plays a critical role in the country’s trade balance. 18  Although the 
majority of countries have implemented unbundling and corporatisation, public sector 
provision largely dominates and in many cases the finances of distribution 
companies have not improved. Indeed, Nepal and Jamasb (2012b) argue that in 
smaller systems (e.g. Nepal), the creation of an independent regulatory authority 
may be more important than unbundling, particularly for politically unstable countries 
and especially where hydropower is predominant. 
 
                                                          
18 Maldives aims to achieve ‘carbon neutrality’ in energy by 2020. 
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Open access has been implemented in just five countries, with some obstacles. In 
India, for instance, the main impediment has been the imposition of ‘surcharges’ by 
public utility companies on large industrial consumers to compensate for the loss in 
revenue.19 In Indonesia, the state company PLN continues to be the sole owner of 
transmission and distribution assets as it is given priority rights under the law to 
conduct its business. In Thailand, despite open access public sector companies 
operate geographically segregated oligopolies and have majority shares in private 
generation companies, (Wisuttisak, 2012). 
 
Four Asian countries: Brunei, India, Philippines and Singapore have implemented 
distribution privatisation. Singapore is arguably the most advanced, with seven 
electricity retailers and the Market Support Services Licensee competing for 
(contestable) retail consumers. Privatisation in the Philippines’ electricity distribution 
sector has on the other hand resembled the switch from a public to a private 
monopoly. India has had mixed experience with distribution privatisation - Odisha in 
1996, carried out without restructuring, and Delhi in 2002, with bids were awarded on 
the basis of the largest promised reductions in average commercial and technical 
losses, with the gains shared with consumers. In May 2015 Odisha's state electricity 
regulator revoked the licenses of the three private distribution utilities, citing 'gross 
failure in raising their performance and financial health, reducing distribution loss, 
preventing theft of energy and running the organisation in a financially viable manner' 
(Mohanty, 2015). Distribution assets were consequently taken over by the state-
owned grid management company GRIDCO. 
 
It is therefore evident that developing Asian economies (and developing countries in 
general – see Table 2.2) have implemented hybrid versions of the standard OECD 
reform model, as their reform processes have often been influenced by country-
specific heterogeneity 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Industrial consumers cross subsidise agricultural consumers; hence in the absence of tariff reform, open access 
has serious financial consequences for public utilities. 
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Figure 2.2: Structure of the Electricity Sector in 150 Developing Countries 
 
Source: Gratwick and Eberhard (2008); Besant-Jones (2006) 
Note: GenCo, TransCo, DistCo refer to generation, transmission and distribution companies. 
 
 
3. Electricity Reforms and Environmental Objectives 
 
As Table 3.1 below shows, electricity (and heat) production account for the largest 
proportion of emissions from fuel combustion across most economies, implying that 
the electricity sector presents a significant opportunity for potential emissions 
reduction. 20  This is why in OECD countries (particularly the EU) environmental 
objectives have mainly been pursued through decarbonisation of the electricity 
sector. 
 
 
                                                          
20 Followed by transport – however, many countries are aiming for the electrification of transport to 
mitigate emissions. 
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Table 3.1: CO2 Emissions by Sector, 2013 (million tonnes of CO2) 
 Electricity & 
Heat 
Production 
Other 
Energy 
Industry 
Own Use 
Manufacturin
g 
and 
Construction 
Transpor
t 
Residenti
al 
Othe
r 
Total CO2 
Emissions 
from Fuel 
Combustion 
OECD 
4,866 722 1,378 3,384 
932 755 
12,038 
Asia 
6,069 
504 
3,665 
1,428 
483 481 12,630 
India 
4,386 367 2,806 754 330 
334 
8,977 
China 
945 43 493 222 87 
79 
1,869 
Africa 
435 88 137 289 69 
58 
1,075 
Middle 
East 
639 121 344 386 124 35 1,648 
Source: IEA (2015) 
 
Under the OECD model, electricity prices in liberalized wholesale markets are set 
according to system marginal cost - the short-term marginal cost of the last (and, 
following the merit order, typically most expensive) plant that is required to be 
brought onto the system in order to meet demand. 21  Generation companies are 
incentivized to compete on costs, as those with lower short-term marginal costs than 
the system marginal cost will gain from this. These markets are also referred to as 
‘energy only markets’ in that the incentives to encourage more investment in 
generation are considered as being built into the price signals, rather than through 
externally imposed generation adequacy standards 22 . The market effectively 
determines how much generation capacity is required (UKERC, 2010). Energy-only 
markets are largely designed to match the characteristics of conventional (fossil) fuel 
generation and investment (Keay et al., 2013a; 2013b). 
 
                                                          
21 This section draws from Keay et al. (2013a; 2013b); Buchan and Keay (2014); Keay (2013a; 2013b; 
2009), Robinson (2013), Rhys (2013) and Sen (2014). 
22 Such as by a government or regulator. 
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Renewable energy has high capital costs but a zero marginal cost of operation. 
Further, renewable energy is intermittent 23  and while during periods of abundant 
availability supply could be sufficient to match demand, the intermittency requires 
that ‘backup’ generation be available to ensure continuity of supply. It is important 
that this backup is flexible and able to adjust quickly to demand – implying the use of 
fossil fuels, hydro or nuclear (Sen, 2014). 
 
Two problems emerge here: first, in order to encourage the capital intensive 
investments in renewables governments have to offer support schemes such as 
Feed-in Tariffs (FiTs) or other subsidies which undermine the role of the liberalized 
market in setting prices and in motivating investment. Second, the unpredictability of 
renewables (e.g. wind) implies that market prices will either be set equal to zero 
marginal costs (e.g. during periods of abundant wind) or set at very high levels at 
times when renewables are low or unavailable (in order to allow backup generators 
to recover their costs and justify capital investments in backup generation). This 
could imply shorter periods of zero or low prices and longer periods of very high 
prices (Keay et al., 2013a; 2013b); these high prices would be difficult to justify to a 
public which already questions high energy prices, as market liberalization was 
largely propagated on the basis of ‘competitive’ prices (Sen, 2014). 
 
Further, if renewables are integrated into wholesale markets in their current form, 
they may not even recover their fixed costs (without extra-market payments) 
because when they run, prices would be low or zero (Robinson, 2013). It has also 
been argued that support schemes such as FiTs discourage innovation through 
‘cherry picking technologies’ thereby impeding reductions in the capital costs of 
renewable energy (Keay et al., 2013a; Keay, 2013b). Arguably, even if the technical 
costs of renewable energy were to decline over time, system or resource costs could 
continue rising, as the resource may tend to get costlier the more it is exploited 
(Keay, 2013a).24 
 
                                                          
23 E.g. wind, and solar in the absence of large-scale commercial storage technologies. 
24 In other words, the easiest and best sites for the development of renewable energy are likely to be 
used up early on (Keay, 2013a). 
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These problems reflect some of the inherent contradictions between the OECD 
model and newer environmental objectives of reforms in which the sector needs to 
rely increasingly on renewable energy sources. The solutions that have been 
advocated to this problem in OECD countries can be categorized into two: the 
greater use of markets to ensure investments in both renewables and backup 
generation (that is, the setting up of separate capacity and balancing markets in 
addition to energy-only markets), or conversely, the establishment of a single-buyer 
agency to coordinate the integration of renewables into the electricity sector (Keay et 
al., 2013a; 2013b; Newbery, 2013). 
 
The shift to a sustainable, low carbon electricity system does not preclude the 
original hurdle of cost-reflective pricing. Asian countries continue to grapple with 
important distributional issues, and in the past the direct use of the pricing system to 
address these issues has led to regressive outcomes, which have ended up 
benefitting the rich. Systems of direct cash transfers to eligible consumers have been 
adopted in some countries (e.g. India, Indonesia) as a method of removing pricing 
distortions and targeting poorer consumers for subsidies. 
 
3.1 Economic vs. Environmental Objectives in Asian Developing Countries 
 
One way of viewing the contradictions between economic and environmental 
objectives in the OECD reform model is that markets and institutions created through 
reforms may gradually evolve to resolve these conflicts. However, three factors 
suggest that a paradigm shift in the reforms process is critical in Asian developing 
economies. The first and most obvious one is rising electricity demand. The second 
is that for developing countries, the amount of effort required to bring about a policy 
outcome can be disproportionate to the value of that outcome (Sen and Jamasb, 
2013)25, necessitating proactive policy choices in the short term. 
 
The third is that these countries stand to lose the most from climate change in terms 
of its human costs (IPCC, 2007), and it can be assumed that their citizens will hold 
                                                          
25 Referring, for instance, to the difficulties governments have had with implementing cost-reflective 
pricing, despite the last two decades of electricity reform. 
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governments accountable for inaction – in other words, environmental policy is 
becoming as much a political issue as cost-reflective pricing. This has indeed been 
seen recently in countries such as China and India. For instance, in late 2015 
citizens in Delhi launched litigation against municipal authorities on grounds of their 
inaction to combat rising urban air pollution, proven to be detrimental to human 
health.26 
 
As Table 1.1 showed, any serious effort at decarbonisation would need to have the 
electricity sector at its core, as electricity comprises the largest source of emissions 
across the board, and provides the most direct way to reduce emissions (Keay, 
2009). In this regard, non-OECD Asian countries face a series of challenges in 
balancing economic and environmental objectives in the process of electricity sector 
reforms. We summarise the main ones below. 
 
3.1.1 Investment in generation 
 
While energy-only markets focus on short-term marginal costs, they do not 
separately take into account long-run marginal costs, which are directly related to 
investments in generation. The problem of adequate investment in generation under 
the OECD reform model stretches across developed and developing countries; 
however, the nature of the investment problem is different for both. In developed 
countries the concern is whether markets will deliver investments in renewables and 
backup generation, or whether a single buyer agency should take on the task. In 
Asian economies, the single buyer (central planning) model has arguably failed to 
deliver adequate investment in both conventional and renewable generation. 
 
The investment problem faced by Asian countries is complex: it requires a solution 
that (a) ensures universal access to electricity, (b) is based on cost-reflective pricing, 
(c) integrates renewables onto the system, and (d) is free from political appropriation. 
The design of investment mechanisms for developing economies necessitates a 
closer look at the hybrid market structures that have emerged in these economies – 
                                                          
26 See ‘Notice to Centre, Delhi government, after plea on pollution by Toddlers’, Indian Express, 8 
October 2015. http://www.ndtv.com/delhi-news/notice-to-centre-delhi-government-after-plea-on-
pollution-by-toddlers-1229910 
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in terms of identifying all these structures and working out how they could function in 
conjunction with each other towards a defined set of goals. Essentially, this strategy 
could comprise a looser, less sophisticated approximation of the ‘multiple markets’ 
solution being considered in the UK. 
 
3.1.2 Access and the proliferation of coal 
 
Most Asian developing countries continue to struggle with extending access to 
electricity. If developing countries were to fully implement the OECD model (full 
electricity market liberalization assuming that the problem of cost-reflective pricing 
and finances of utilities were addressed along the way), then the system could 
arguably be successful in balancing electricity generated from renewables with 
electricity from conventional (fossil) fuels. The irony here is that backup generation is 
likely to be coal – which is cheap and plentiful but environmentally far more 
damaging than say gas, which is its closest substitute – constituting a significant 
policy contradiction. 
 
Despite this limitation of markets, it is by no means certain that a central planning 
agency would advocate the exclusion of coal from the energy mix, particularly as 
energy has been viewed as a balance of payments problem in net-importing Asian 
countries (Sen, 2014). Countries therefore need to implement some form of a 
(binding) carbon price to square the balance between economic and environment 
reform objectives. 
 
An added dimension is the role of multilateral financial institutions, which provided 
the original catalyst for electricity reforms. Although many have discontinued lending 
to coal projects, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) accounted for roughly 
US$51 billion in the financing of coal-related projects from 2007–13. 27  Some 
multilateral finance institutions have announced that they will cease funding 
inefficient coal projects. By some accounts, bilateral finance to coal-fired power from 
Exim banks and export credit agencies, has formed the larger proportion of IFI 
financing over the last five years. 
                                                          
27 See www.huffingtonpost.com/jake-schmidt/too-much-public-funding-i_b_4314333.html. 
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3.1.3 Cross-border electricity trade 
 
One approach being pursued in OECD countries with a view to the promotion of 
clean energy, the reduction of costs in its provision, and the availability of electricity 
to countries that face a deficit, is regional electricity market integration. ‘Large 
regional markets’, achieved through cross-border integration, have been proposed 
as a way of ensuring greater flexibility in the response of generation to demand, as a 
larger pool of plants is available to call upon for dispatch (Riesz et al., 2013). 
 
For instance, the EU’s climate and energy package sets binding legislation for its 
‘20-20-20’ targets – namely, a 20% reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions from 
1990 levels, raising the share of EU energy consumption from renewables by 20%, 
and a 20% improvement in the EU’s energy efficiency –to be achieved by 2020, with 
a longer term goal of an 80–95% reduction in emissions by 2050. This is to be 
achieved through a set of policy tools based on greater market integration 28 
combined with nationally-driven targets on emissions reduction. Several regional 
electricity market integration initiatives exist in Asia, supported by multilateral finance 
(such as the ADB) – for instance, electricity trading in the Greater Mekong sub-
region (GMS) – comprising Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and the Yunnan 
Province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region of China – primarily takes place 
through bilateral exports. In South Asia, interconnections exist between India, 
Bangladesh and Bhutan. 
 
The OECD reform model has however led to conflicts between national and regional 
targets in the EU. For EU countries such as France, where 75% of electricity is 
generated from nuclear energy and is low-priced by European standards, greater 
market integration is likely to led to higher prices (at least initially), which is unlikely 
to be accepted by French consumers who initially had to pay higher tariffs to finance 
the early capital investments in nuclear energy (Percebois, 2013). Also, there is 
some ambiguity over EU regulations against national governments providing ‘state 
                                                          
28 See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm for details. The EU Emissions Trading 
System has been widely criticized for its ineffectiveness. 
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support’ to emissions reduction schemes that are unsanctioned at EU level, as this 
could be seen as undermining the principle of competitive markets. 
 
4. Balancing Economic and Environmental Objectives – The 
Case of Three South Asian Countries 
 
The current debates over the suitability of the OECD model in delivering on both 
economic and environmental objectives presents an opportunity for Asian developing 
countries, most of which have progressed little, or midway, towards implementing the 
model, to identify solutions which can address both objectives without mimicking the 
experience of OECD countries. Essentially, from the above discussion it can be 
argued that this would entail delivering electricity through a system which 
encompasses 1) low emissions 2) a suitably flexible baseload to intermittent 
renewables 3) a competitive price, particularly with regard to low income consumers, 
and 4) adequate market incentives (or pricing signals) for investors. 
 
A prominent means of balancing these objectives has been attempted through inter-
regional electricity market integration29, such as in the cases of the EU (described 
above) and in other parts of the world. 30 In this section, we explore this further 
through a comparative case study using three countries based on 1) geography; 2) 
shared experiences of electricity reform; and 3) ongoing efforts towards greater 
regional market integration. The three South Asian countries analysed here are: 
India (which accounts for the largest regional share of emissions and abundant low 
cost coal reserves), Bhutan, and Nepal (which both account for the highest 
reserves/potential of hydropower in the region, mostly underdeveloped). In such a 
market, given that hydro reserves are subject to sovereign property rights, the role of 
private investment and markets (relatively advanced in India) would largely be 
concentrated on infrastructure and other renewables capacity (e.g. solar). 
 
In this section, we first review country experience on electricity reforms against the 
context of economic and environmental objectives for India, Bhutan and Nepal. We 
                                                          
29 See Singh et al. (2015) for a discussion of how political economy factors can sometimes constrain regional electricity market 
integration, using a case study of South Asia. 
30 Latin America, and the Greater Mekong region in East Asia. 
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then analyse the argument for greater market integration as a potential solution to 
achieving the ‘balance’, and barriers to the same. 
 
Table 3.2 Key electricity indicators: India, Bhutan, Nepal 
 Installed 
capacity 
(MW) 
Peak 
deman
d 
(MW) 
Electr-
icity 
deficit 
(% peak 
demand) 
IPPs 
as 
capacit
y (%) 
Access 
rate 
(%) 
Technical 
losses (% 
consumpti
on 
Per capita 
consumpti
on (kWh) 
Hydro 
potenti
al (GW) 
Coal 
reser
ves 
(Bt) 
India 24,3021
8 
129,81
5 
 34.0 75 23.65 917 148 126 
Bhutan 1,615 336   95.5 9.3 2,600 33 - 
Nepal 787 1,200 40 33.3 76 25.03 106 83 - 
Source: Yangki and Tashi (2016); World Development Indicators; UNOSD (2014); Authors 
 
4.1. India 
 
Power sector reforms in India have been undertaken in three phases (Victor and 
Heller, 2007). The first phase, in 1991, focused on the introduction of IPPs into 
generation, with little success. Enron’s attempt to set up an IPP widely cited as the 
failure of India’s 1991 effort to open up the power generation sector (Mukherjee, 
2014). 31  The second phase, in the mid-1990s, constituted state-level efforts at 
restructuring State Electricity Boards into unbundled companies and setting up 
independent electricity regulatory commissions.32 The third phase was marked by the 
legislation of the Electricity Act in 2003, which consolidated and replaced all previous 
federal laws governing the electricity sector, and was a fairly momentous step 
forward in India’s hitherto unsteady reform progress. The provisions of the Act aimed 
to transform the electricity market from a non-competitive, Single Buyer Model to a 
Multiple Buyer Model with several competing participants in the generation, 
transmission and distribution segments. Sen and Jamasb (2013) provide a 
comprehensive analysis of power sector reforms in India. 
 
                                                          
31 Enron’s early attempt to set up an IPP in India ran into significant problems, with allegations over 
excessively high tariffs in the Power Purchase Agreement with the State Electricity Board (which the 
Board allegedly could not afford to pay) leading to the state government of Maharashtra reneging on 
its agreement with Enron. After several years mired in expensive litigation, Enron exited the project, 
shortly before its own financial collapse. The project has since been taken over by a public 
consortium, which is still struggling to revive it to its originally envisaged full capacity. See Mukherjee 
(2014) for a discussion of private participation in generation in India and the Enron experience and 
Sant and Dixit (1995) for arguments in favour of the cancellation of the project at the time. 
32 Orissa in 1996, Haryana in 1997 and Andhra Pradesh in 1998. 
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Consequently, India has a hybrid version of the OECD/standard model; state-owned 
utilities exist alongside private companies in generation and distribution, and power 
is mostly traded through Power Purchase Agreements while a relatively small but 
growing proportion of electricity is traded on short-term markets through power 
exchanges and bilateral contracts.33 In Figure 3.1, the top row represents generation 
– comprising a mix of federal and state government utilities, private and privatized 
companies, IPPs, and captive generators. Two power exchanges and the state-
owned Power Trading Corporation of India (second row) facilitate a small percentage 
of market-based trading, whereas the majority of trade is carried out through longer-
term Power Purchase Agreements. The third and fourth rows depict transmission 
and distribution companies (retail supply and distribution are integrated) which 
include government (federal and state)-owned companies as well as private 
licensees, and the last row shows categories of consumers. 
 
Figure 3.1: Power Sector Restructuring in India 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Singh (2010) 
 
                                                          
33 Approximated at 11% of the total electricity market. The short-term power market in India covers 
contracts of less than a year’s duration transacted through trading licensees, power exchanges, direct 
trading between distribution companies, and through ‘unscheduled interchanges’. (CERC, 2013). 
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There are three distinctive characteristics of India’s electricity reform experience. 
First, despite the early failures with IPPs, the latter have provided a functional 
alternative to the lack of public sector capacity additions. The government’s planned 
programme of adding supercritical coal-fired generation plant capacity through ‘Ultra 
Mega Power Plant’ projects34 have faced similar issues with tariff levels and the 
economic viability of distribution utilities to purchase power from IPPs. These issues 
have been partially resolved through the increase of low-cost domestic coal 
production and the auctioning of domestic coal supply linkages to IPPs.35 Notably, 
briefly India achieved a ‘surplus’ of power for the first time in decades in 2016-17. 
 
A second characteristic is that India is beginning to demonstrate problems similar to 
those seen currently in the OECD, where a system based on marginal cost pricing 
cannot cope with the intermittency of renewables, whilst linking in with long-term 
incentives for investment in backup generation. Attempts at incorporating renewables 
have run into problems. For instance, a ‘renewables purchase obligation’ (RPO) 
requires distribution utilities to purchase a certain proportion (set by state regulators) 
of electricity from renewables, or alternatively an equivalent amount in ‘renewable 
electricity certificates’ (each equating to 1 MWh) on India’s two main power 
exchanges. However, the exchanges have reported a growing inventory of untraded 
certificates since the programme’s inception. For instance, the Indian Electricity 
Exchange, which accounted for over 90% of the domestic electricity trading market 
in 2015, reported that of 9.6 million certificates available in fiscal 2014-15, only 3.1 
million had been traded. 
 
A third characteristic is the continued failure of state-owned distribution utilities to 
enforce cost-reflective pricing, implying that they are often unable to fulfil their RPOs. 
A debt restructuring programme announced in November 2015, asked state 
governments to appropriate 75% of distribution utilities’ debts over a period of 2 
years. Following this the debts were to be included as part of state fiscal deficits, 
thereby necessitating that states take parallel measures to increase power sector 
                                                          
34 The details of this programme can be found at  
http://powermin.nic.in/upload/pdf/ultra_mega_project.pdf 
35 The Indian government in 2014/15 carried out a series of ‘reverse auctions’ for coal to IPPs. This 
has been criticised as an unsustainable solution from the point of view of climate/environmental goals, 
as it encourages the use of coal. 
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tariffs and eliminate subsidies. The incentive to states which implement this reform 
was the according of priority in other federal funding. However, two previous 
attempts at debt restructuring have failed, as it is incumbent upon state governments 
(often reluctant to increase tariffs for their constituents) to implement reform. 
 
Despite the penetration of competitive markets into India’s electricity sector, 
problems continue to exist with regional imbalances and constraints to the 
evacuation of power, the most prominent illustration of which was the simultaneous 
failure of three of India’s five regional transmission grids in July 2012. In February 
2016, the percentage composition of India’s 289 GW of installed capacity was: coal 
(61), oil (0.34), gas (8), nuclear (2), hydro (15) and renewables (13). Within 
renewables, solar and wind were 13 and 65 per cent, respectively. According to the 
IEA, CO2 emissions from electricity comprise the single largest proportion (44 per 
cent) of total CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in India. Given that roughly a third 
of its population lack access to modern commercial energy, India’s government in 
2014 set a target of providing ‘24x7 electricity to all’ by 2019. Despite the 
environmental implications, India’s government plans to triple coal production to 1.5 
bn tonnes by 2019 to meet this target. While India plans to add 100 GW of solar, 60 
GW of wind and 15 GW of other renewables to installed capacity by 2022, these 
require an exponential growth in the renewable energy market which is unlikely to be 
achieved.36 Further, it faces issues over land acquisition and resettlement pertaining 
to new (as well as existing) hydro power projects. The viability of this target is 
therefore contingent not just upon the continued expansion of installed capacity in a 
sustainable manner, but also on further technical and financial reforms to the 
electricity sector. Given its dual emissions and development implications, the power 
sector therefore represents the biggest hope for a successful confluence of India’s 
electricity and climate policy, but at the same time, its biggest hurdle. 
 
One way of achieving this is through regional electricity market integration with 
neighbouring South Asian countries which have considerable hydro and gas 
resources. India already has an interconnection with Bangladesh which supports 500 
MW and is being upgraded to 1000MW. There have been discussions since 1970 on 
                                                          
36 For instance, in order to meet the solar target (solar comprised 5GW of installed capacity in 2016) the solar energy market 
has to add 12 GW/year, from current levels of 1GW/year. (See Sen, 2016). 
23 
a sub-marine India-Sri Lanka HVDC link, and India has interconnection and trading 
agreements in place with Nepal and Bhutan (discussed below). More importantly, 
with its status as South Asia’s largest (and growing) electricity market and quasi-
competitive structure (particularly in generation), India will play a pivotal roles in 
facilitating South Asia’s regional electricity market integration. 
 
4.2 Bhutan 
 
Bhutan joined the global reform bandwagon in the mid-1990s. Key drivers of reforms 
in the Bhutanese power sector were: i) the institutional weakness of the sector, (ii) 
inability to assume the role of key growth driver in promoting the country’s economic 
development through power exports, iii) providing access to electricity for rural 
consumers and iv) poor cost recovery and dependence on donor financing for new 
investments (ADB, 2010). Table 3.2 summarizes the major reform timelines and the 
current status of the Bhutanese power sector. The wholesale market is based on a 
single buyer model (SBM) consisting of multiple buyers and single seller. The 
electricity supply industry is vertically integrated with only functional separation of 
generation, transmission and distribution. Private participation in the generation 
segment was initiated in 2008 while independent regulation was instituted in 2010. 
 
Table 3.3 Reform Timeline in Bhutan 
2001 Electricity Act passed 
2002 
Functional unbundling of the Power Sector 
Bhutan Power Corporation made responsible for Transmission and 
Distribution 
2008 
Druk Green Power Corporation Limited (DGPC) was established in 
January, 2008 and made responsible for developing, maintaining and 
operating hydropower plants owned by the Royal Government of Bhutan 
(RGoB) 
2010 
Bhutan Electricity Authority (BEA) made responsible for regulation and 
became fully autonomous in January, 2010 
Source: Yangki and Tashi (2016) 
 
Regulatory and institutional reforms in the energy sector have successfully 
contributed to the development of hydropower in Bhutan. The economy that was 
once solely reliant on foreign aid now is self-reliant due to hydropower revenue 
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which has been ploughed back into social and industrial sectors. Domestic tariff has 
been kept low to increase energy affordability and stimulate economic growth. Rural 
electrification is high priority in Bhutan implying universal urban electrification and 
99% rural electrification. Notably, a continuous supply of electricity is available to 
industrial consumers. 
India and Bhutan signed a bilateral agreement in 1996 under the Indo-Bhutan Power 
exchange. The agreement provided that all surplus power would be sold to the 
Government of India (GOI) which in turn GOI is committed to purchase all the 
surplus power (Saran, 2014). An umbrella agreement was signed in 2006 under 
which India provides project investigation, design and engineering services, 
constructional supervision and highly concessional finance for upcoming hydro 
projects which allows India to supply power to Bhutan under a swap arrangement. 
Electricity sales (domestic and export) amounts to over 45% percent of the total 
internal government revenues, and 20% of GDP. Around 75% of electricity was 
exported to Bhutan’s largest trading partner India, in 2014 (Yangki and Tashi, 2016). 
Hydroelectric energy is considered to be a clean form of renewable energy in Bhutan 
with a potential of 83 GW. Hydroelectricity exports have allowed Bhutan to offset 4.4 
million tonnes of CO2 annually with the potential to offset up to 22.4 million tonnes of 
CO2 per year by 2025 (Arora and Dema, 2016). Most projects are run of the river and 
therefore environmentally benign, due to the rivers flowing through deep valleys 
while rich forests cover 70% of the land. Bhutan’s constitution also mandates that its 
territory be covered by at least 60% percent by forests (Arora and Dema, 2016). This 
target may need revisiting considering Bhutan’s growing population and concurrent 
energy and development requirements. 
 
4.3 Nepal 
 
Power sector reform in Nepal has been unsuccessfully pursued since the early 
1990s, and marked by political instability resulting in discontinued policies and an 
environment which has disincentivised investment. The original drivers of reforms 
included the inability of the sector to extend electricity access to all consumers, 
inability to attract investments in electricity generation, high transmission and 
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distribution losses and electricity theft. Nepal and Jamasb (2012) and Singh et al. 
(2015) summarize the historical contexts, drivers and various attempts towards 
reforming the Nepalese power sector. After more than two decades of the initial 
reform attempt, the state-owned Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) still remains a 
vertically integrated entity with minimal functional separation among generation, 
transmission and distribution operating under a Single Buyer model. A legally 
independent regulator was introduced 1993, but subsequently revoked, and then 
reinstated in 2011. IPPs in electricity generation were originally introduced in 1992. 
 
Table 3.4 Reform Timeline in Nepal 
1984 
Nepal Electricity Authority Act, 1984 enacted to set up Nepal Electricity 
Authority (NEA) 
 
1992 
Hydropower Development Policy 2049 (1992) issued. 
 
1992 
The NEA Act amended to “enable the NEA to function autonomously”. 
NEA transformed from being as a sole player to a licensee to buy 
electricity generated by private IPPs. 
 
1993 
Electricity Regulations, 1993, introduced to operationalize the 
Electricity Act, 1992 to enable entry of IPPs. 
 
2001 
Hydro-Power Development Policy, (2058) 2001 issued to develop 
country's hydro resources including those for export purposes. 
 
2006 
Rural Energy Policy 2006 issued to address, among others, the 
energy needs of the rural population, creation of a rural energy 
subsidy scheme. 
 
2013 
Subsidy Policy for Renewable Energy (2069) issued to increase 
access to renewable energy to low-income households through 
subsidy and access to credit, to support rural electrification and to 
attract private investors. 
 
Source: Nepal and Jamasb (2012) 
 
The performance of the Nepalese power sector after more than two decades of 
reforms is not satisfactory when assessed against the anticipated outcomes. 
Transmission and distribution electricity losses are relatively high at 25%. Around 
50% of the population is connected to the grid, while around 25% have off-grid 
access. However, the supply and demand gap was about 410 MW resulting in load 
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shedding up to 14 hours a day in 2013 (World Bank, 2015). As such, the lack of 
access to reliable grid electricity is one of the key obstacles in overcoming poverty 
reduction and a major constraint to an export-led economic growth. Electricity tariffs 
continue to remain below cost-recovery levels. However, notable progress has been 
made with IPPs, which account for 33% of total installed capacity. 
 
A Bilateral Power Trading Agreement between Nepal and India commenced in 1966 
with an initial exchange of 5 MW in 1971. Three river treaties (Koshi, Gandak and 
Mahakali) were also signed between these countries to support power generation 
and trade (Saran, 2014). Power Trading Corporation (PTC) representing the GOI has 
signed a power purchase agreement with Nepal for supply of 150 MW for 25 years 
through the upgrade of existing 132 KV transmission links. In 2014, a Power Trade 
Agreement (PTA) was signed between Nepal and India although its implementation 
continues to be pending (Bhat, 2016). Hence, the PTA has not yet delivered the 
anticipated benefits arising from market accessibility due to slow progress in 
implementation although the hopes are high. 
 
Like Bhutan, Nepal also relies on hydropower which is considered to be clean and 
renewable, originating mostly from run of river projects. Nepal has the potential to 
generate 83GW (with around 40GW commercially feasible) of hydroelectricity. 
Hence, the environmental benefits in terms of carbon offsets by generating 
hydroelectricity and trading with India (and even South Asia) are large (Timilsina et 
al., 2015). Nonetheless, unlike Bhutan, Nepal does not have any mandate to ensure 
any minimum forest coverage of its territory. 
 
It is evident that regional electricity market integration through hydropower in the 
three South Asian countries presents one solution that meets the four objectives laid 
out at the beginning of Section 3. The electricity sector/market structures of the three 
countries arguably facilitate this – for instance referring back to Table 2.2, Bhutan 
and Nepal represent a sector structure similar to Models B and C, whereas India 
represents a market similar to D and E. Market integration particularly presents 
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significant gains for emissions reduction. It is estimated that every GWh of coal fired 
generation In India releases close to 1,000 tonnes of CO2 (Wijayatunga et al., 2015). 
Indeed, some studies attempting to quantify the benefits of such as solution arrive at 
positive results. Toman and Timilsina (2016) for instance set out the gains in terms of 
a more balanced distribution of regional installed capacity, composition of installed 
capacity – reductions in thermal (coal) and increases in renewable (primarily hydro) 
capacity, increases in transmission capacity and resultant reductions in emissions, 
relative to a baseline scenario. 
 
Table 3.5: Gains from Increased South Asia Electricity Integration 
Changes in countries’ total installed 
generation by 2040 (GW) 
Afghanistan (+4), Bangladesh (-11), 
Bhutan (+9), India (-35), Nepal (+52), 
Pakistan (-13), Sri Lanka (-1) 
Changes in regional installed 
generation capacities  by 2040 by 
technologies (GW) 
Hydro (+72), Coal (-54), gas (-6), Wind 
(-7) 
Changes in cross-border & inter-grid 
transmission capacities (GW) 
Net increase in cross-border 
transmission capacity (+95); Inter-grid 
capacity in India (-37) 
Reduction of regional power sector CO2 
emissions 
8% 
Source: Toman and Timilsina (2016) 
 
Wijayatunga et al. (2015) examines the economic benefits of six interconnections 
within South Asia (India Nepal 400 kV; India-Sri Lanka Submarine Link; Bangladesh-
India HVDC Link; India-Pakistan 220/400 kV; CASA 1000 Link) by comparing their 
investment costs and their gains – importantly, the latter includes the benefits of 
unserved energy reductions(i.e. alleviating power shortages and facilitating greater 
access). It finds that the six interconnections could lead to a total benefit of over $4 
Bn against a cost of one-tenth of that amount. When unserved energy reductions are 
excluded, the benefits are largely confined to fuel (or dispatch) related cost savings; 
the break-even utilisation level for a high-cost link to recover a decent return on 
investment would be very high (Wijayatunga et al., 2015). Unserved energy 
reductions are therefore an important distinction in developing countries as opposed 
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to developed countries, and imply that regional electricity market integration in 
developing Asian is not subject to the same caveats as in OECD markets. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This chapter has described and analysed the seemingly contradictory objectives of 
electricity sector reform: between economic efficiency and environmental 
sustainability via decarbonisation, with specific regard to developing Asia. While 
electricity sector reforms have aimed at economic efficiency, there has also been a 
recent move towards incorporating decarbonisation as an objective of reforms, as an 
effective way of reducing emissions. 
 
Our review of electricity sector reform with reference to economic efficiency 
concluded that despite the initial promise of electricity reforms, the ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach has not worked in Asian developing economies. One reason for this is that, 
while standard reform models implicitly assume stable institutional, regulators, and 
political frameworks, many developing countries lack strong institutions required to 
underpin successful reform (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008). In addition, factors such 
as initial resource endowments and the size of electricity systems have also been 
identified as having the potential to affect outcomes (Jamasb et al. 2015; Nepal and 
Jamasb, 2011). Other differences in starting conditions are also important (e.g. 
reforming in a situation of excess capacity where average costs are above marginal 
costs, as opposed to deficits, where they are below marginal costs). 
 
Two factors have stood out on why developing Asian economies have been 
unsuccessful in implementing reforms to achieve economic objectives. The first is 
the continual inability of governments to implement cost-reflective pricing. This has 
given rise to a circular but crucial problem. The absence of cost-reflective pricing to 
begin with implied that reform was likely to lead to rising prices; thus public 
opposition to these price increases typically created an ex ante impediment (Sen and 
Jamasb, 2013; Littlechild, 2000; Newbery, 2000). 
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A second factor is a shift, sometime in the 2000s, in the focus of reforms from 
operating efficiency of utilities, to capacity addition, given growing concerns over 
‘energy security’ and shortages. For example in India, captive generation was 
encouraged as a way of circumventing the lack of grid capacity addition;37 it has 
been argued that this ‘dichotomy’ in electricity sector structure –the state sector 
coexisting alongside the private sector – had an underlying political basis (Joseph, 
2010). It allowed a separation of the problem of supply and shortages from the 
problem of deteriorating finances in state-owned utilities, thus reinforcing the 
‘electricity–politics nexus’ and circumventing the issue of cost-reflective pricing 
(Joseph, 2010).38 
 
As a result, despite over two decades of reform involving the standard model and its 
variations, few developing countries, let alone developing Asian countries, have 
successfully progressed to the extent of full liberalization. These intrinsic obstacles 
have in the past been regarded as an evolving part of the reform process, overcome 
through the gradual strengthening of institutions and competition. However, a 
recently added dimension to the discourse relates to suitability of the OECD model to 
achieve not just economically efficient but also environmentally sustainable electricity 
systems, with renewables playing a greater role. 
 
Using three South Asian country case studies, we have argued that the two goals 
can be potentially balanced by utilising the synergies brought about via greater 
regional electricity market integration. There are however hurdles to this, such as 
infrastructure and efforts required to translate bilateral trading agreements into 
competitive market arrangements. Arguably, one of the determinants of whether 
market integration will be realised is the cost of off-grid electrification solutions 
versus the cost of enabling infrastructure and market arrangements required towards 
greater regional market integration. This arguably presents a whole new set of 
challenges for Asian countries, and also presents an avenue for further research. 
 
                                                          
37 In India, the Value of Lost Load (VOLL) was estimated at Rs. 34–122 per KWh, compared with the 
weighted average of short-term prices on power exchanges at Rs. 4.96 (CERC, 2013). Captive 
capacity is believed to account for a third of India’s total installed capacity. 
38  Industries can generate independently, whereas state utilities which serve residential and 
agricultural consumers struggle with cost-reflective pricing. 
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